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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on appeal are as follows:
1.

Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment in favor of HCU on
Mountainwest's claim for tortious interference with economic relations?

A district court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness. Hariine v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). "Because entitlement to
summary judgment is a question of law, [an appellate court is to] accord no deference to the
trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented." Id. In conducting this de novo review,
the appellate court should "apply the same standard as that applied by the trial court."
Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977). The standard applied by the trial
court is set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).
These issues were preserved in the trial court by motion. See R. at 211 (HCU's
motion); R. at 252 (opposition memorandum); R. at 344 (reply memorandum); R. at 518
(Minute Entry); Order (Order, attached as Exhibit A to Mountainwest's appellate brief).
2.

Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment in favor of HCU on
Mountainwest's claim for abuse of process?

A court's decision to grant or deny summary judgment is reviewed for correctness,
according no deference to the trial court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Hariine.
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912 P.2d at 438. In conducting this de novo review, the appellate court should "apply the
same standard as that applied by the trial court." Durham, 571 P.2d at 1334. The standard
applied by the trial court is set forth in Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), as noted above.
These issues were preserved in the trial court by motion. See R. at 211,252,344,518.
3.

Did the district court err in refusing to strike the affidavit of Richard Vincent?

This issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See In re General Stream Adjudication,
1999 UT 39, f25, 982 P.2d 65 (stating that "an affidavit is simply a method of placing
evidence of a fact before the court" and that, at least in civil cases, "a trial court decision to
admit evidence is reviewed under a broad grant of discretion").
These issues were preserved in the trial court by motion. See R. at 313 (HCU's
Motion); R. at 452 (Mountainwest's opposition memorandum); R. at 488 (HCU's reply
memorandum); R. at 518 (district court's minute entry); Order (trial court's Order, attached
as Exhibit A to Mountainwest's appellate brief).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or regulations whose
interpretation is determinative of or of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Up until 1973, South Davis Community Hospital, Inc. ("SDCH") operated a small
(74-bed) general acute care hospital in Bountiful, Utah. By the mid-1960s, however, both
SDCH and Davis County leaders had begun to recognize that the SDCH facility was neither
large enough or modern enough to meet the growing demands of southern Davis County
residents. See R. at 395,419. Davis County leaders formulated a plan to build two entirely
754432vl
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new hospitals to serve the county's burgeoning population—one in the north end of the
county, and one in Bountiful in the south end of the county. Id. at 395, 420. At the same
time, however, it was generally understood that it would be impossible to sufficiently
remodel or enlarge the existing SDCH facility, and that an entirely new facility would be
needed. Id. SDCH determined that it did not have the resources to construct and operate a
large new hospital, and accordingly Davis County began to search for other commercial
entities willing and able to finance, construct and operate the new hospital facilities. Id.
After lengthy investigation and negotiation with Davis County and with SDCH,
Hospital Corporation of America ("HC A") agreed to develop, finance, construct and operate
a new and larger hospital—approximately 150 beds—on property adjoining the older and
smaller SDCH facility in Bountiful. That larger hospital was eventually built and is now
known as Lakeview Hospital. Id. at 395-96, 421.
The fruits of the negotiation between HCA, Davis County, and SDCH were a series
of written agreements, entered into in November 1973, under which HCA agreed to develop,
finance, construct, and operate Lakeview Hospital, and under which SDCH agreed to cease
operating its older and smaller hospital next door. Pursuant to these agreements, SDCH
ceased operating its older and smaller hospital (and turned the facility into a nursing home),
and HCA built Lakeview Hospital next door. Id. at 421. Contemporaneously, HCA created
an affiliate business entity known as Hospital Corporation of Utah ("HCU," the
Defendant/Appellee herein) to own and operate Lakeview Hospital. Id. at 421-22.
Some years later, in 1989, in order to straighten out the borders between their
adjoining properties, HCU deeded certain property to SDCH, but those grants contained
754432vl
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certain deed restrictions prohibiting SDCH from constructing certain types of medical
facilities on those deeded properties. Id. at 395-96, 421-22. Specifically, SDCH was
prohibited from establishing, on the properties, a "commercial ancillary facility," defined as
including but not limited to commercial laboratories or x-ray, radiological
imaging, physical therapy, pulmonary or cardiology testing or out-patient
Medical facilities or birthing centers, any of which are offered on a
commercial basis to third party users.
Id.
In 1999, Plaintiffs/Appellees Mountainwest Medical Properties, L.L.C. ("Mountainwest Properties") and Mountain West Surgical Center, L.L.C. ("Mountain West Surgical")
(collectively, "Mountainwest"), together with SDCH, announced a joint venture in which
they planned to build a 47,000 square foot medical complex on the SDCH property adjacent
to Lakeview Hospital. Under the plan, SDCH was to contribute the property adjacent to
Lakeview Hospital (the nursing-home site) to Mountainwest Properties, and was to receive
in exchange a membership interest in Mountainwest Properties. R. at 214; Aplt. Br., at 4.
Fearing that this new medical complex would violate, inter alia, the terms of the 1989
conveyances, HCU made efforts to stop the construction of the new facility. For instance,
HCU exercised its right to appear at certain planning and zoning meetings to express its
opposition to the new medical facility. See R. at 466. Despite HCU's opposition, the local
planning and zoning authorities approved the joint venture's plans for the new medical
facility, and Mountainwest alleges that it then began to make plans to build the facility. Id.
at 466-67. HCU, still believing that the facility would violate, inter alia, the terms of the
1989 conveyances, then filed a lawsuit against SDCH in Second District Court seeking to
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prevent SDCH from contributing the property to Mountainwest for the proposed medical
facility. That lawsuit was filed on January 10, 2000, and is herein referred to as "the First
Lawsuit." See R. at 418-38. HCU sued only SDCH; neither Mountainwest Properties nor
Mountain West Surgical were ever made parties to that action, nor did those entities ever
seek leave to intervene in that action.
In the First Lawsuit, HCU stated three different substantive causes of action: (1) for
breach of the 1973 written agreements; (2) for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied by force of law into the 1973 written agreements; and (3) for breach of the
1989 conveyances. HCU sought damages from SDCH, as well as declaratory and injunctive
relief halting further violations of the 1973 and 1989 written documents. Id. at 418-38. As
set forth in the First Lawsuit, that action's express purpose was to halt what HCU perceived
as a facility that violated the 1973 and/or the 1989 written documents.
In March 2000, a few weeks after filing the First Lawsuit, HCU filed a Lis Pendens
("the Lis Pendens"), and recorded that document with the Davis County Recorder. Id. at
504-08. The Lis Pendens, on its face, stated plainly that HCU was making no claim to title
of the SDCH property; rather, the document simply gave notice of the pending lawsuit:
Hospital Corporation of Utah, dba Lakeview Hospital, the above-named
plaintiff, has a pending Complaint against the above-named defendant South
Davis Community Hospital, Inc. in the above-entitled Court for injunctive
relief against South Davis5s proposed use of certain real property owned by
South Davis.
Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
Mountainwest has alleged in this lawsuit that "the Lis Pendens effectively stopped the

754432vl

-5-

project/' because the project lender allegedly "withdrew its commitment for construction
financing." See R. at 467. However, as discussed below, Mountainwest has never presented
any admissible evidence supporting this contention.
At the time, however, SDCH did not take any action to strike or otherwise
immediately remove the Lis Pendens. Rather, it filed a summary judgment motion seeking
to dispose of HCU's claims in the First Lawsuit. After briefing and argument, the district
court in the First Lawsuit determined that SDCH was entitled to summary judgment on
HCU's claims related to the 1973 written agreements. See R. at 398-401. The district court
also held that the Lis Pendens was a "wrongful lien" because in the First Lawsuit HCU made
no claim to title of the property in question. Id. at 401-03. However, the district court also
determined that genuine issues of material fact remained for trial with respect to HCU's
claims related to breach of the 1989 property conveyances. The court noted as follows:
There is . . . a factual issue as to whether the Medical Center will be used for
commercial purposes to third party users, or if it will be used merely for
physicians' existing patients. HCU contends that the Medical Center will
provide acute medical treatment on a commercial basis to third party users.
SDCH, on the other hand, contends the Medical Center will be used by
physicians to treat their existing patients. It is unclear what constitutes an
"existing patient" for the purposes of this restrictive covenant. This fact is also
clearly material.
See R. at 398. Accordingly, on June 28,2000—less than four months after the Lis Pendens
had been filed and recorded—the district court issued a written ruling memorializing its
determination that (a) part of HCU's claims in the First Lawsuit (those related to the 1973
agreements) were dismissed on summary judgment; (b) part of HCU's claims (specifically,
those claims related to the 1989 conveyances) were supported by enough evidence to proceed
754432vl
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to trial; and (c) the March 2000 Lis Pendens was wrongfully filed. See id. at 394-405.
Following the issuance of the district court's written opinion in the First Lawsuit,
SDCH still did not (until August 2001, more than 13 months following the ruling) seek
immediate removal of the Lis Pendens, even after it had been determined to be wrongfully
filed. Rather, SDCH and HCU entered into settlement negotiations, and finally in the
summer of 2002 reached an accord and settled the case. As part of the settlement, HCU
agreed to dismiss its lawsuit, release the Lis Pendens, and pay SDCH an undisclosed sum of
money; for its part, SDCH agreed not to convey the property in question to Mountainwest.
The First Lawsuit was dismissed, and the Lis Pendens released, in July 2002. Also,
Mountainwest ended up building its proposed medical facility at a different site.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On January 7, 2004, Mountainwest filed the instant lawsuit ("the Second Lawsuit")
in Second District Court, naming HCU as the sole defendant. In the Second Lawsuit,
Mountainwest alleged that HCU, by filing the First Lawsuit and the Lis Pendens, caused the
proposed medical facility to be built in a different location at an elevated cost and after a long
delay. Mountainwest alleges that these delays and additional costs resulted in damage to
Mountainwest. See R. at 1-7. Mountainwest alleged three substantive causes of action
against HCU: (1) for tortious interference with prospective economic relations; (2) for abuse
of process; and (3) for violations of various anti-trust provisions. Id. Mountainwest
eventually voluntarily dismissed its anti-trust claims, leaving only the tortious interference
claim and the abuse of process claim for judicial determination. Id. at 450-51, 460-61.
Mountainwest served process on HCU on March 3, 2004. Id. at 9. Rather than
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answer the complaint, HCU filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6),
arguing that Mountainwest failed to state any claim upon which relief could be granted. See
id. at 11-26. After full briefing, the motion to dismiss was orally argued on May 25, 2004.
Id. at 125-74 (transcript). HCU argued that, even if one were to assume that the allegations
in Mountainwest's complaint were true, Mountainwest could still not state a claim of abuse
of process because Mountainwest had not even alleged that HCU had used the process of the
First Lawsuit for a purpose other than the purposes stated on the face of the lawsuit. Id. at
125-36. And HCU argued that Mountainwest could not state a valid claim of tortious
interference because the alleged improper means—the filing of the First Lawsuit and the Lis
Pendens—were protected by the judicial proceedings privilege and therefore could not form
the basis for liability. Id. at 136-39.
After hearing oral argument, the district court (after expressing some concern about
being reversed on appeal if it granted the motion) denied the motion as to the abuse of
process and tortious interference claims. Id. at 171-72. The district court entered an order
memorializing its ruling on June 11, 2004. Id. at 54-55.
On June 29,2004, HCU, believing strongly that Mountainwest's claims were subject
to dismissal, asked this Court to entertain an interlocutory appeal of the district court's
rulings on the motion to dismiss. Id. at 56. This Court referred the matter to the Utah Court
of Appeals, which denied the petition and refused to hear the interlocutory appeal. Id. at 81.
Upon remand, HCU answered Mountainwest's complaint (which had been amended
by this time), and the parties' respective counsel held an attorneys' planning meeting on
October 27, 2004 to set the relevant schedules for litigation of the Second Lawsuit. At the
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meeting, counsel for both sides agreed to exchange initial disclosures by November 15,2004,
to complete fact discovery by July 8, 2005, and to have the case ready for trial by March
2006. See id. at 207-09. In addition, Mountainwest's counsel agreed to identify all expert
witnesses in the case by August 8, 2005. Id. at 208.
The first deadline—for submission of initial disclosures—came and went on
November 15, 2004, and Mountainwest failed to submit initial disclosures as agreed to.
In December 2004, HCU sent a set of written discovery to Mountainwest. Id. at 22637. Among other things, HCU asked Mountainwest to "[i]dentify each and every fact
witness you may call to testify at the trial of this matter, and state the substance of their
anticipated testimony." Id. at 229. Mountainwest's responses to that written discovery
would have been due on or about January 17, 2005. Mountainwest's counsel telephoned
HCU's counsel to ask for several extensions of time to respond to the discovery, which
HCU's counsel courteously granted.

After several extensions of time, however,

Mountainwest still failed to provide any response to the written discovery, and on May 24,
2005—more than five months after the discovery would have originally been due—HCU
filed a motion to compel, asking the district court to order Mountainwest to respond to the
discovery. See id. at 246-48.
Mountainwest did not ever file a response to the motion to compel either. In the
interim, the scheduling dates for the completion of fact discovery (July 8) and for the
identification of Mountainwest's expert witnesses (August 8) came and went. During this
time, Mountainwest not only failed to respond to HCU's written discovery and to its motion
to compel, but Mountainwest also conducted no discovery, written or otherwise, of its own,
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and did not designate or identify any expert witnesses.
Finally, in September 2005, HCU filed a motion for summary judgment on
Mountainwest's claims, reasoning that because Mountainwest had not participated in any
discovery, had refused to provide HCU with a list of witnesses it would use to support its
claims, and had not designated any experts, that it had failed to come forward with any
evidence to support its claims, and for these reasons (and for the reasons already advanced
at the motion to dismiss stage) Mountainwest's claims were subject to dismissal. See id. at
211-25. As HCU put it in its opening brief on summary judgment,
Plaintiffs have done nothing with this case. They have never filed Initial
Disclosures, never promulgated any discovery, and failed to file any expert
reports. The deadlines for those actions are now passed. [HCU] now renews
its motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment.
Id. at 212.
The filing of this summary judgment motion spurred Mountainwest into action like
nothing else theretofore had. Mountainwest filed a brief opposing the summary judgment
motion, and for the first time submitted a document (an affidavit) bearing the name of a
witness (Richard Vincent) that it planned to use to support its claims. Id. at 252-70. In
addition, Mountainwest moved for summary judgment in its favor on its abuse of process
claim (but not on its tortious interference claim). Id. at 381-92. Also, Mountainwest filed
a motion seeking leave to amend the scheduling order to allow it to re-open discovery to
atone for its previous failure to participate in discovery. Id. at 446-49.
For its part, HCU opposed Mountainwest's partial summary judgment motion. Id. at
462-82. In addition, HCU filed a motion to strike the affidavit of Richard Vincent on the
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grounds that Mountainwest did not participate in discovery and did not identify Mr. Vincent
as a potential fact witness and did not allow HCU the opportunity to depose Mr. Vincent
during the discovery period, and on the additional ground that much of what Mr. Vincent had
to say in his affidavit was without proper foundation. Id. at 313-20.
After full briefing, these motions came before the district court for oral argument on
January 20,2006. Id. at 530. The district court granted HCU's summary judgment motion,
summarily dismissing Mountainwest's claims for abuse of process and tortious interference.
With respect to the tortious interference claim, the district court made the following ruling:
With respect to Plaintiffs' interference claim, the Court rules that as a matter
of law neither the [First Lawsuit] or the Lis Pendens filed by [HCU] in
connection with [the First Lawsuit] can form the basis for an interference
action for the reasons stated in [HCU's] brief. Plaintiffs have failed to
factually demonstrate the elements of an interference claim and the conduct
alleged to constitute interference is privileged as a matter of law.
See Order (attached as Exhibit A to Mountainwest's brief), at 2. With respect to the abuse
of process claim, the district court made the following ruling:
[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of an
ulterior motive on the part of [HCU] or a willful act not proper in the regular
course [of] proceedings that caused Plaintiffs' harm. The Court rules that as
a matter of law that the Lis Pendens filed by [HCU] herein in connection with
[the First Lawsuit] cannot form the basis for an abuse of process claim for the
reasons stated in Defendant's brief. In addition, Plaintiffs offer no testimony
from any lender or title company that the Lis Pendens, as such, caused them
to refuse to proceed with the sale of the underlying land.
Id. In sum, the district court concluded that "Plaintiffs have not come forth with evidence
to create any disputed issue of fact and Defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a
matter of law." Id. The district court also stated that
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[a]n additional basis for the Court's decision... is Plaintiffs failure to comply
with the agreed schedule in the Attorneys' Planning Meeting Report filed
herein. This includes the failure of the Plaintiffs to file Rule 26 Disclosures,
to respond to discovery during the factual discovery period, and file expert
reports on the appointed date.
Id. In keeping with this ruling, the district court granted HCU's motion on both the tortious
interference and abuse of process claims, and denied Mountainwest's partial cross-motion
on the abuse of process claim. Id. at 2-3.
In addition, the district court denied Mountainwest's motion to amend the scheduling
order. Id. at 3.
Also, the district court denied HCU's motion to strike the affidavit of Richard
Vincent, stating that "this Court has granted [HCU's summary judgment motion]
notwithstanding such affidavit." Id. at 2. The district court's failure to grant this motion to
strike is the subject of HCU's cross-appeal in this matter.
On appeal, Mountainwest appeals from the district court's grant of summaryjudgment
in HCU's favor on its tortious interference and abuse of process claims. HCU cross-appeals
from the district court's failure to grant its motion to strike the affidavit of Richard Vincent.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mountainwest's complaint with HCU is that HCU initiated and filed an allegedly
baseless lawsuit against SDCH, and then publicized that lawsuit by filing a Lis Pendens. The
tort that is usually available to litigants who feel aggrieved by the initiation of "baseless"
lawsuits is wrongful use of civil proceedings, not abuse of process or tortious interference.
However, the wrongful use tort is unavailable to Mountainwest here, because (a)
Mountainwest was not a party to the First Lawsuit, and wrongful use is a claim only available
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to the party sued in the initial lawsuit; and (b) the First Lawsuit was never actually terminated
in favor of SDCH because the parties eventually settled the lawsuit out of court.
Finding the tort that is intended to cover this situation unavailable to it, Mountainwest
has tried mightily to shoehorn its grievance into other torts, such as abuse of process and
tortious interference. But these other torts simply do not fit the situation.
Mountainwest's claim for tortious interference fails for the simple reason that all of
the acts Mountainwest complaints of—the filing of the First Lawsuit and Lis Pendens—are
protected by the judicial proceedings privilege, and under well-established Utah case law
cannot form the basis for a tortious interference claim. Mountainwest claims that the First
Lawsuit was "unfounded litigation" that constitutes "improper means" for the purposes of
a tortious interference claim, but this argument runs directly counter to established Utah law
discussing the judicial proceedings privilege. The bottom line for Mountainwest is that
unless the First Lawsuit meets the elements of the "wrongful use of civil proceedings" tort,
it cannot use the First Lawsuit as the basis for a tortious interference claim.
Mountainwest's claim for abuse of process also fails. This claim is infirm because
it too is defeated by the judicial proceedings privilege—acts immunized for purposes of a
tortious interference claim are also immunized for purposes of an abuse of process claim.
Moreover, Mountainwest has completely failed during discovery to adduce facts supporting
its abuse of process claim. Mountainwest must show that HCU had an ulterior purpose in
filing the First Lawsuit and/or the Lis Pendens, and that HCU committed a wilful act in the
First Lawsuit that was not proper in the regular course of the proceedings. Mountainwest has
no admissible evidence in support of any of this.
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Indeed, as the district court noted, Mountainwest completely ignored this case
throughout the entire discovery period. Mountainwest did not provide initial disclosures, did
not respond to HCU's written discovery, and did not respond to HCU's follow-up motion to
compel. Moreover, Mountainwest did not propound any discovery of its own, and did not
take a single deposition. At no point in the process—at least not until HCU filed its summary
judgment motion after the discovery period had closed—did Mountainwest so much as
disclose the identity of a single witness. At the end of the discovery period, Mountainwest
had done absolutely nothing to prove up its claims, and had no evidence in support of them.
After the summary judgment motion was filed, Mountainwest submitted an affidavit
from Richard Vincent that it asserted supported its claims. However, that affidavit was
untimely and without foundation. Mountainwest does not even purport to have any other
evidence in support of its claims.
Faced with this situation, the district court properly dismissed, on summary judgment,
Mountainwest's claims for tortious interference and abuse of process. That portion of the
court's decision should be affirmed. The district court erred, however, in refusing to strike
the affidavit of Richard Vincent, and that portion of the court's decision should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
Mountainwest purported to state two causes of action against HCU: for tortious
interference and abuse of process. Both causes of action arise out of the same allegations,
namely, that HCU filed an allegedly baseless lawsuit against SDCH, and publicized that
lawsuit through the filing of a Lis Pendens, allegedly causing damage to Mountainwest. The
district court correctly recognized, however, that both of Mountainwest's causes of action
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suffer from both legal and factual infirmities. The district court's decision to enter summary
judgment on both of Mountainwest's causes of action was correct and should be affirmed.1
However, the district court erred when it refused to strike the untimely and
inadmissible affidavit of Richard Vincent.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MOUNTAINWEST'S
CLAIM FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE, BECAUSE BOTH THE FILING
OF THE FIRST LAWSUIT AND THE FILING OF THE LIS PENDENS ARE
PROTECTED BY THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE
The district court correctly dismissed Mountainwest's claim for tortious interference.

In order to state such a claim, a plaintiff must show three elements: (1) that the defendant
intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs existing or potential economic relations, (2) for
an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. See Anderson
Dev. Co. v. Tobias. 2005 UT 36, ^[20, 116 P.3d 323. With respect to the second element,
Mountainwest does not assert that HCU acted with an improper purpose; rather,
Mountainwest's tortious interference claim has always been based on an allegation that HCU
acted with improper means. See R. at 4 (Complaint). Mountainwest's tortious interference
claim fails because Mountainwest is simply unable to show that HCU acted with improper
means: neither the filing of the First Lawsuit nor the filing of the Lis Pendens can qualify
1

As this Court has stated, an appellate court may only reverse a trial court on matters
raised and adjudicated below, but an appellate court may affirm a trial court's decision "if
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal
by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the
lower court." See Bailey v. Bavles. 2002 UT 58, flO, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v.
McPhie, 2001 UT 61, f 18, 29 P.3d 1225).
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as "improper means" for purposes of a tortious interference claim, because both actions are
protected by the judicial proceedings privilege.
Under Utah law, "judges, jurors, witnesses, litigants, and counsel involved in a
judicial proceeding have an absolute privilege against" nearly all tort suits. See Krouse v.
Bower. 2001 UT 28, ^[8, 20 P.3d 895 (emphasis added); Bower v. Stein Eriksen Lodge
Owners Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1134,1138 (D. Utah 2002) ("statements of attorneys, parties,
judges, witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process enjoy an absolute privilege
against liability for torts if the statements are made during or preliminary to a judicial
proceeding"). "The policy behind such privilege is to encourage full and candid participation
injudicial proceedings by shielding the participant from potential liability for defamation."
Price v. Armour. 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997).2 The privilege "is premised on the
assumption that the integrity of the judicial system requires that there be free and open
expression by all participants and that this will only occur if they are not inhibited by the risk
of subsequent" lawsuits. kL ^quoting Allen v. Ortez. 802 P.2d 1307, 1311 (Utah 1990)).
This Court has held that the privilege shields participants injudicial proceedings not
only from defamation lawsuits, but also from lawsuits alleging other torts, such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress and (notably for the purposes of this case) intentional
interference with economic relations. See id. at 1258; DeBry v. Godbe. 1999 UT 111, f 25,

2

This Court has also recently recognized similar privileges in other analogous contexts.
See Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, f26,116 P.3d 323 (recognizing the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine as immunizing actions constituting petitions to the government); Riddle v. Perry,
2002 UT 10, T| 10,40 P.3d 1128 (recognizing a privilege immunizing statements and actions
taken when addressing the state legislature).
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992 P.2d 979. If a statement or action falls within the judicial proceedings privilege, liability
under these torts cannot be based on that statement or action.
Utah courts have developed a three-part test for determining whether a statement or
action falls within the judicial proceedings privilege:
To establish the judicial proceeding privilege, the statements must be (1) made
during or in the course of a judicial proceeding; (2) have some reference to the
subject matter of the proceeding; and (3) be made by someone acting in the
capacity of judge, juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.
DeBry, 1999 UT 111, Tfl 1, 992 P.2d 979. The privilege and its three elements are to be
interpreted broadly, in order to further the privilege's purpose of encouraging full and candid
participation injudicial proceedings. Krouse, 2001 UT 28, f 10, 20 P.3d 895; DeBry, 1999
UT 111,1[14, 992 P.2d 979.
A.

The Lis Pendens

The filing of HCU's Lis Pendens is protected by the judicial proceedings privilege.
This Court has stated that "[a] lis pendens is, in effect, a republication of the pleadings.
Since the publication of the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the republication thereof by
recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly privileged." See Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d
186,190 (Utah 1976). This Court summed up its holding by stating that the "recordation of
a lis pendens was absolutely privileged and the action of [the cross-claimant] for slander of
title cannot be sustained." Id. Utah's federal district court, applying Hansen, recently
reached the same conclusion. See Bower, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.3
3

This holding comports with the holdings of other state courts, which have held that
statements made in lis pendens are protected from liability. See, e.g., Zamarello v. Yale, 514
(continued...)
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In fact, in Bower, the court held that even an improperly filed lis pendens is protected
by the privilege, and that therefore the counterclaimant could not maintain a tortious
interference claim based on the filing of the lis pendens. In Bower, the counter-claimant was
making the argument that the lis pendens filed in that case was improper because it allegedly
did not have anything to do with title to the property in question, and argued by extension
that this "improperly filed" lis pendens was not protected by the privilege. The court
squarely rejected that argument, stating that "[noncompliance with filing requirements in
no way abrogates the privilege which has long gone hand in hand with judicial proceedings;
the remedy is removal of the noncomplying material." Bower, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1139
(quoting Prappas v. Meyerland Comm. Improvement Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 794, 797-98 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1990)). In Prappas, the court made the point even clearer, stating that the proper
remedy for a plaintiff harmed by an improperly filed lis pendens is not to file a tort suit
against the filer, but, rather, to seek a judicial order removing the lis pendens. Prappas, 795
S.W.2d at 797. The court used examples from other contexts to illustrate its point:
For example, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible in a trial. [Rule 402]. Such
evidence, when offered, is therefore subject to an order to strike it from the
record. Thus if a witness testifies, "Yes, the defendant is the man who shot
me, and by the way, he has a loathsome disease," the court should sustain a
timely objection, strike the slanderous remark, and instruct the jury to
disregard it. Yet no one would suppose for a moment that the privilege
evaporated simply because the comment was unauthorized. The same result

3

(...continued)
P.2d 228 (Alaska 1973); Albertson v. Raboff. 295 P.2d 405 (Cal. 1956); Procacci v. Zacco.
402 So. 2d 425 (Fla. Ct. App. 1981); Wendy's of South Jersey, Inc. v. Blanchard Mgmt.
Corp. of New Jersey, 406 A.2d 1337 (N.J. Super. Ct. Chancery Div. 1979); Prappas v.
Meyerland Comm. Improvement Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990).
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would occur if an impropriety surfaced in another part of civil proceedings .
. . , namely pleadings. For example, an amended pleading would be
"unauthorized" if it were filed late and without leave of court, see Tex. R. Civ.
P. 63, but one cannot conceive of such a defect making the slightest difference
as far as absolute privilege is concerned. Rather, the remedy would be for the
aggrieved party to ask the court to strike the offending papers. Although such
a pleading, like irrelevant evidence, is not authorized in the sense in which
appellants employ that term, no loss of privilege ensues.
Id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, there can be no liability for tortious interference associated with HCU's
filing of the Lis Pendens.
B.

The Filing of the First Lawsuit

Mountainwest next argues that the mere filing of the First Lawsuit constitutes
"improper means" sufficient to support a tortious interference claim. Mountainwest's argument is that the First Lawsuit was "unfounded litigation" and therefore constitutes "improper
means." See Aplt. Br., at 15-18. This argument fails on both legal and factual grounds.
1.

Mountainwest has no evidence supporting its claim that the First
Lawsuit was "unfounded."

As an initial matter, before discussing the legal infirmities inherent in Mountainwest's
claim, it is worth noting that Mountainwest utterly failed to come forward with any evidence
supporting its claim that the First Lawsuit was "unfounded." The first step down the path
to showing that litigation may be "unfounded"—and an essential step used in the only Utah
case cited by Mountainwest in which a plaintiff actually used "unfounded litigation" as the
allegedly improper means—is to show, inter alia, that the earlier "unfounded" lawsuit was
terminated on the merits against the plaintiff. See Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657
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P.2d 293, 299 (Utah 1982) (stating that both "previously initiated lawsuits" alleged to have
been "unfounded" had in fact terminated on the merits against the party that brought the
lawsuits). Here, Mountainwest cannot make even this initial showing, because the First
Lawsuit was not terminated in favor of SDCH; rather, the case was resolved in an out-ofcourt settlement with one claim against SDCH still viable and very much alive. R. at 398.
Thus, in order to show that the First Lawsuit was "unfounded," Mountainwest
proposes to do what no reported Utah decision has sanctioned: it proposes to litigate, in this
lawsuit, the issue of whether the First Lawsuit was "unfounded," without the essential first
step of having that earlier litigation already decided on the merits against the filer. Faced
with this obstacle, one would have expected Mountainwest to diligently pursue discovery in
an effort to make this unprecedented showing. However, Mountainwest did absolutely
nothing during the discovery period—did not submit initial disclosures, did not respond to
written discovery requests, did not respond to a motion to compel, did not propound any
written discovery of its own, and did not take a single deposition.
In the end, Mountainwest has nothing (except the self-serving and untested affidavit
of Richard Vincent, which is the subject of HCU's cross-appeal, discussed below) to support
its claim that the First Lawsuit was "unfounded." And that affidavit is not admissible,
because Mr. Vincent has no foundation to make the statements he makes, and because HCU
was denied the opportunity to depose and cross-examine the affiant. Mr. Vincent is not a
judge, or even a lawyer, and yet Mr. Vincent feels qualified to aver that the proposed medical
facility would not have violated the 1989 conveyances. This is simply not proper evidence.
Thus, because Mountainwest's claim is completely unsupported by any admissible
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evidence, its claim that the First Lawsuit was "unfounded litigation" fails.
2.

The judicial proceedings privilege protects the filing of the First
Lawsuit from a tortious interference claim, at least where the First
Lawsuit did not terminate on the merits in favor of SDCH.

Factual infirmities aside, Mountainwest is barred on legal grounds from claiming that
the First Lawsuit was "unfounded litigation." The judicial proceedings privilege, as
discussed above, protects litigants from being sued for tortious interference for any statement
or action taken during the course of litigation. See Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d at 1258.
Because the filing of a lawsuit is the quintessential action taken during litigation, it
necessarily follows that the filing of lawsuit is protected by the judicial proceedings
privilege, see, e ^ , Beezlev v. Hansen. 286 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah 1955) (stating that the
privilege protects "all pleadings and affidavits necessary to set the judicial machinery in
motion"), and that the filing of a lawsuit—however "unfounded"—cannot be the "improper
means" necessary to support a tortious interference claim.
Mountainwest, however, points toward this Court's pronouncement in Leigh Furniture
that "unfounded litigation" can serve as "improper means." See Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d
at 308-09 (stating that "unfounded litigation" can constitute improper means, and holding
that two lawsuits previously adjudicated on the merits against the filer were "unfounded").
However, Mountainwest overlooks the fact that Leigh Furniture is not necessarily
inconsistent with this Court's later-decided judicial proceedings privilege cases.
This Court has not—until now—had the opportunity to confront the intersection
between Leigh Furniture's statement about "unfounded litigation" and Price v. Armour's
holding that the judicial proceedings privilege immunizes actions taken in a lawsuit from
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liability for tortious interference. Examination of this intersection requires the examination
of the origins of the "interference" tort in Utah, as well as the examination of other courts'
treatment of this intersection.
Although some early Utah cases dealt with the issue of interference with contract, see,
e.g., Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 602 (Utah 1962), the contours and variants of the tort
were more or less undefined in Utah prior to this Court's issuance of the Leigh Furniture
opinion. In Leigh Furniture, this Court stated expressly for the first time that it recognized
the tort, and proceeded to set forth the contours of the tort in Utah. In doing so, the Court
noted that certain states and the First Restatement had adopted a "prima-facie tort approach";
that other states and the Second Restatement had adopted a factor-balancing approach; and
that Oregon had outlined a "middle ground." See Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 302-04. After
analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of the three approaches, this Court rejected the
approach taken by the First Restatement and the approach taken by the Second Restatement,
and adopted the "middle ground" formulation of the tort that had been set forth by the courts
of Oregon. Id. at 304. Specifically, this Court adopted the formulation of the tort set forth
in Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Or. 1978), and held that,
in order to state a claim under the new "interference" tort, "a plaintiff must prove (1) that the
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff s existing or potential economic relations,
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff." Id.
In addition, this Court's determination that "improper means" could include "unfounded
litigation" was taken directly from Top Service. See Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308.
Because Utah's version of tortious interference is taken from Oregon law rather than
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from the Restatement, it is useful to examine the Oregon appellate courts' treatment of the
interplay between "unfounded litigation" and the judicial proceedings privilege. The precise
issue presented here was addressed by the Oregon Court of Appeals in Mantia v. Hanson, 79
P.3d 404 (Or. Ct. App. 2003), review denied, 90 P.3d 626 (Or. 2004), where a party was
attempting to use "unfounded litigation" as the basis for a tortious interference claim. The
court began its analysis by noting that the "absolute" judicial proceedings privilege was not
actually absolute, because at least one tort—for wrongful use of civil proceedings—remained
available to plaintiffs claiming to be aggrieved by the filing of a "baseless" lawsuit. Id. at
408. The court noted, at the outset, that
this case implicates a fundamental tension between the law of "absolute
privilege" . . . and the recognition that there are exceptions—most obviously
the availability of "wrongful initiation" actions . . . —to the general principle
that attorneys cannot be civilly liable for actions undertaken in representing a
client.
Id. at 407. The court noted that some states had resolved this tension by adopting an
"exclusive tort" approach under which the only tort available to parties aggrieved by the
filing of a lawsuit was the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings. Id. at 413.4 The Oregon
Court of Appeals stated that this "exclusive tort" approach was "appealing," but ultimately
determined that it could not adopt that approach given the language already extant in its case
law, including Top Service, that "unfounded litigation" could form the basis of a tortious
interference claim. Id. at 413-14. In the end, however, the Oregon court adopted something

4

One notable state to adopt this "exclusive tort" approach is California. See Silberg v.
Anderson, 786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1990) (noting that "the only exception to application of [the
privilege] to tort suits has been for malicious prosecution actions").
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quite similar to the "exclusive tort" approach, holding that litigation was only "unfounded"
for purposes of a tortious interference claim when all of the elements of the tort of wrongful
use of civil proceedings were satisfied. Id. at 414. In such a situation, a plaintiff could
potentially have both a wrongful use claim and a tortious interference claim on the same
facts. However, under this approach, if the plaintiff has no wrongful use claim, then the
plaintiff by the same token has no cognizable claim that the litigation is "unfounded," and
therefore has no tortious interference claim related to the filing of the earlier lawsuit. Id.
The simplest solution to the apparent contradiction between Price v. Armour and
Leigh Furniture would be for this Court to adopt the exclusive tort approach espoused by
California and discussed by the Oregon Court of Appeals in Mantia. Under this approach,
litigants aggrieved by the filing of an allegedly baseless lawsuit would have one and only one
avenue open to them: the filing of a lawsuit for wrongful use of civil proceedings. Under
this approach, "unfounded litigation" would no longer be considered a potential "improper
means" for purposes of a tortious interference claim. This approach would require a partial
overruling of Leigh Furniture.
If this Court is unwilling to expressly overrule Leigh Furniture's statement that
"unfounded litigation" can serve as "improper means" for purposes of a tortious interference
claim, then the approach that makes the most sense, when viewed against the backdrop of
this Court's tortious interference and judicial proceedings privilege cases, is the approach
taken by the Oregon appellate courts—the same courts from which this Court derived its
original formulation of the interference tort. Like the Oregon courts, this Court also has case
law stating, on the one hand, that actions or statements taken during the course of a judicial
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proceeding are immune from tortious interference lawsuits, see Price, 949 P.2d at 1258, but
on the other hand stating that "unfounded litigation" can constitute the "improper means"
necessary to support a tortious interference claim, see Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 308-09.
The way to reconcile these two seemingly contradictory pronouncements is to follow Mantia
and establish a rule that "unfounded litigation" for purposes of a tortious interference claim
means litigation that is otherwise actionable under the tort of wrongful use of civil
proceedings and that meets all of the elements of that tort. This approach is entirely
consistent with Leigh Furniture, because in that case the elements of the wrongful use tort
were apparently met. This approach also retains the viability of the judicial proceedings
privilege, whose purposes are so vital to the efficient functioning of our court system.5
The other option—and the one implicitly urged upon this Court by Mountainwest—is
to ignore or overrule Price v. Armour and the other judicial proceedings privilege cases, and
allow litigants to sue parties and/or attorneys for tortious interference simply because they
have filed a lawsuit that the plaintiff considers "baseless." See Aplt. Br., at 15-18. This
approach would go far toward eroding the judicial proceedings privilege, and indeed entirely
ignores the vital policies underlying the privilege: to encourage full and fair participation in

5

In addition, both the exclusive tort approach and the Mantia approach—for that matter,
any approach that links "unfounded litigation" to the wrongful use tort—have the added
advantage of preventing strangers to a lawsuit from re-opening that lawsuit in later litigation.
If parties are to be adequately incentivized to settle cases, those parties need to have comfort
that third parties who were not involved in a lawsuit cannot appear later and re-open the
litigation by filing a follow-on suit. Taking an alternative approach, like that urged by
Mountainwest, would chill settlement and would force parties to litigate—and, indeed,
expand litigation by adding parties—rather than resolve cases out of court. Linking
"unfounded litigation" to the elements of the wrongful use tort provides adequate protection
against "baseless" litigation while at the same time preserving the settlement mechanism.
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litigation by eliminating fear of tort suits arising from participation in litigation. See Price,
949 P.2d at 1256,1258 (stating that "[participation in ajudicial proceeding will be inhibited
unless all claims arising from the same statements are protected"). This approach would also
create practical problems of proof: what is a "baseless" or "unfounded" lawsuit, if not one
that meets all of the elements of wrongful use of civil proceedings?
Mountainwest claims that its argument is supported by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts6 and by some cited cases, but this is simply not the case. Mountainwest's quotation
from the Restatements commentary on tortious interference is misleading, because
Mountainwest omits from that quotation one critical cross-reference. In discussing the nature
of the actor's conduct that could lead to liability for tortious interference, the drafters of the
Restatement mention "prosecution of civil suits," and state as follows:
Litigation and the threat of litigation are powerful weapons. When wrongfully
instituted, litigation entails harmful consequences to the public interest in
judicial administration as well as to the actor's adversaries. The use of these
weapons of inducement is ordinarily wrongful if the actor has no belief in the
merit of the litigation or if, though having some belief in its merit, he
nevertheless institutes or threatens to institute the litigation in bad faith,
intending only to harass the third parties and not to bring his claim to definitive
adjudication. (See §§ 674-681B).
See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 767, cmt. c (emphasis added). Mountainwest omitted
the underscored portion of that quotation, which (notably) refers the reader directly to the
Restatement's discussion of the wrongful use tort. When read in its entirety, the Restatement
is saying the same thing as the Oregon Court of Appeals did in Mantia: that litigation only

6

It is worth remembering that this Court, in Leigh Furniture, expressly declined to adopt
the Restatement (Second) of Torts' formulation of tortious interference, and adopted the
Oregon version of the tort instead. See Leigh Furniture, 657 P.2d at 303-04.
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rises to the level of improper conduct for purposes of a tortious interference claim when that
same litigation would also be subject to a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings.7
If this Court were to adopt the exclusive tort approach, there could be no cause of
action for tortious interference based on the filing of a lawsuit. Under that approach, all that
Mountainwest would have at its disposal would be a claim for wrongful use of civil
proceedings. Even under the Mantia approach, Mountainwest will only have a tortious
interference claim related to the filing of the First Lawsuit if it can make out the elements of

7

The case law cited by Mountainwest, where applicable at all, is to the same effect—that
litigation is only improper for purposes of tortious interference where the elements of
wrongful use are met. See, e.g.. National Ass'n of Prof. Basketball Leagues, Inc. v. Very
Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143,1150-51 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying Oklahoma law, and
rejecting the tortious interference claim because the litigation did not meet the elements of
the wrongful use tort); Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598, 603-04 (3d Cir.) (applying
Pennsylvania law, which adopted the formulation of the tort set forth in the First Restatement, and stating that the judicial proceedings privilege would apply to bar tortious interference claims based on wrongful litigation, except where the substantive elements of the tort
of wrongful use of civil proceedings are met), cert, denied, 496 U.S. 926 (1990); Matsushita
Elec. Corp. v. Loral Corp., 974 F. Supp. 345, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying New York
law, and stating that a lawsuit constitutes "improper means" only if the substantive elements
of the wrongful use tort are met, and only if Noerr-Pennington immunity does not apply);
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 797 F.2d 70,75 (2d Cir.) (applying
New York law, and stating that a lawsuit constitutes improper means only if the substantive
elements of the wrongful use tort are met), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986).
The other cases cited by Mountainwest in its footnote are unhelpful. Some of them
simply contain passing statements, akin to the one in Leigh Furniture, that litigation can
constitute "improper means," without discussing the parameters of "unfounded litigation"
and without even alluding to the potential application of the judicial proceedings privilege.
See, e.g., Guard-Life Corp. v. S. Parker Hardware Mfg. Corp., 406 N.E.2d 445, 449 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1980); Corning, Inc. v. SRU Biosvstems, LLC, 292 F. Supp. 2d 583, 585-86 (D.
Del. 2003); Cacique, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 2004 WL 609278 (N.D. 111. 2004). And the last case
is directly contrary to Utah law as announced in Price v. Armour, in that the case announces
a Tennessee rule that the judicial proceedings privilege does not apply to tortious interference
claims. Trau-Med of America, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 71 S.W.3d 691, 702 (Tenn. 2002).
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wrongful use of civil proceedings. Put simply, under any approach that retains the integrity
of the judicial proceedings privilege, Mountainwest will be required to prove that the First
Lawsuit fits the criteria for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
And, to be clear, Mountainwest does not even claim to be able to prove the elements
of wrongful use of civil proceedings. At first blush, this is curious, because wrongful use of
civil proceedings appears on the surface to be the tort that best fits this situation, where
Mountainwest's grievance against HCU is that HCU initiated an allegedly baseless lawsuit
against SDCH. This Court has stated that "wrongful use of civil proceedings" is the "civil
counterpart to malicious prosecution" and that the tort "consists in instituting and
maintaining civil proceedings for an improper purpose and without a justifiable basis." See
Gilbert v. Ince. 1999 UT 65, f 18, 981 P.2d 841. The Jnce Court went on to adopt the
Restatement (Second) of Torts' formulation of the tort:
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation, or procurement of
civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for
wrongful civil proceedings if (a) he or she acts without probable cause, and
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper adjudication of
the claim in which the proceedings are based, and (b) except when they are ex
parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom
they are brought.
Id. at f 19 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 674) (emphasis added); see also Hatch
v. Davis, 2004 UT App 378, ^[22, 102 P.3d 774 (quoting Ince and the Restatement), afTd.
2006UT44,-P.3d—.
This tort is unavailable to Mountainwest in this case, for two independent reasons.
First, a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings can only be brought by the party against
whom the allegedly wrongful lawsuit was brought. See Ince. 1999 UT 65^18,981 P.2d841
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(quoting the Restatement: that a person who files a wrongful lawsuit "against another is
subject to liability to the other" (emphasis added)); Hatch. 2004 UT App 378, f22,102 P.3d
774 (same).

The party against whom the First Lawsuit was filed was SDCH, not

Mountainwest. Indeed, Mountainwest was never a party to the First Lawsuit in any form, nor
did it ever ask for leave to intervene in that lawsuit. For this reason, it is unable to maintain
a cause of action against HCU for wrongful use of civil proceedings.
Moreover, an essential element of any wrongful use claim is that the proceedings in
the earlier lawsuit have "terminated in favor of the person against whom they are brought."
Ince, 1999 UT 65 T[18, 981 P.2d 841. In the First Lawsuit, two of the three substantive
claims were terminated in favor of SDCH, but the third claim—the one related to breach of
the 1989 conveyances—survived summary judgment, and the parties later settled the First
Lawsuit out of court to their mutual satisfaction. Under these facts, the First Lawsuit was
never "terminated in favor o f SDCH. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 674, cmt j
(noting that civil proceedings may be terminated in favor of the person against whom they
are brought in three ways, none of which involves a mutual out-of-court settlement).
For these two independent reasons, Mountainwest cannot satisfy the elements of the
wrongful use tort. Indeed, Mountainwest has recognized this from the outset, and has been
trying to shoehorn its lawsuit into other torts that do not quite fit the facts.
Faced with this exact factual scenario, the court in Mantia ruled that the plaintiff had
no tortious interference claim based on the filing of the allegedly "baseless" litigation:
[T]he Bailey firm's actions in prosecuting Mantia's claims against Hanson
could not constitute actionable "improper means" for purposes of tortious
interference unless and until the "first-party" proceedings were "terminated"
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in Hanson's favor.
See Mantia, 79 P.3d at 414.
Under these facts, and using the Mantia approach, Leigh Furniture remains robust:
the plaintiff in Leigh Furniture could properly use the earlier litigation as "improper means,"
because that litigation had actually terminated in favor of the person against whom it was
brought. The judicial proceedings privilege retains viability, barring all tortious interference
claims based on the initiation of a lawsuit unless the elements of wrongful use can be shown.
And, most importantly for the purposes of this appeal, Mountainwest's tortious interference
claim related to the filing of the First Lawsuit fails as a matter of law, as Mountainwest is
unable to show that the First Lawsuit constituted wrongful use of civil proceedings, because
that lawsuit did not ever terminate in favor of SDCH, the party against whom it was brought.
In the end, Mountainwest is simply unable to show that HCU acted with improper
means. The filing of the Lis Pendens is protected by the judicial proceedings privilege, even
if it was improperly filed. The filing of the First Lawsuit can constitute "improper means,"
if at all, only if that lawsuit satisfies the elements of the tort of wrongful use of civil
proceedings, and the First Lawsuit does not meet those elements because it was never
terminated in favor of SDCH. Finally, even aside from the legal infirmities of its claim,
Mountainwest failed during discovery to come up with any admissible evidence supporting
its tortious interference claim. For all of these reasons, the district court correctly entered
summary judgment in favor of HCU on Mountainwest's tortious interference claim.

754432vl

-30-

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED MOUNTAINWEST'S
CLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS
The district court also correctly entered summary judgment in HCU's favor on

Mountainwest's claim for abuse of process. "The essence of a cause of action for abuse of
process is a perversion of the process to accomplish some improper purpose." See Bennett
v. Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonoueh. 2003 UT 9,148, 70 P.3d 17. "If a legal process
is used for its proper and intended purpose, the mere fact that it has some other collateral
effect does not constitute abuse of process." Id. Indeed, "there is no action for abuse of
process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an
incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant." Id. at f49.
"[E]ven a pure spite motive is not sufficient to state a claim for abuse of process where
process is used only to accomplish the result for which it was created." Id. (quoting Keller
v. Rav, Ouinnev & Nebeker. 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 (D. Utah 1995), affd. 78 F.3d 597
(10th Cir. 1996)). "The usual case of abuse of process is one of some form of extortion, using
the process to put pressure upon the other to compel him to pay a different debt or to take
some other action or refrain from it." See Hatch. 2004 UT App 378, P 3 , 102 P.3d 774
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682 cmt. b) (emphasis added). A prime example
of this is a situation, recently cited by this Court, where a litigant "used legal process to seize
turkeys at the height of the Thanksgiving season in order to force payment of a debt." See
Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, f 39, - P.3d —. Another example of abuse of process gleaned
from Utah case law is found in Keller, where Judge Winder stated that "an excessive
execution on a judgment or attaching property in an excessive amount" would be an abuse
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of process (although the court did not find an abuse of process on the facts presented there).
See Keller, 896 F. Supp. at 1571. One final example of abuse of process raised during oral
argument below is a case of a party maliciously serving process on an opponent on the
opponent's wedding day, when service a few days later would have sufficed. See R. at 132.
The facts of this case are much different from these examples.
In order to state a claim for abuse of process, Mountainwest has the burden of proving
that (1) HCU had an ulterior purpose and (2) HCU committed a wilful act in the use of the
process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings. See Hatch, 2006 UT 55, ^[36,
- P.3d —; see also Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, ^65, 116 P.3d 323; Bennett, 2003 UT
9, ^[47,70 P.3d 17 (stating that "[a] cause of action for abuse of process requires pleading and
proof of two elements: (1) the use of legal process primarily to accomplish a purpose not
within the scope of the proceeding for which it was designed; and (2) malice"). Both
elements are required. With respect to both of its claims—related to the filing of the First
Lawsuit and the Lis Pendens—Mountainwest has failed to carry its burden on either element.
A.

The Filing of the First Lawsuit Does Not Constitute an Abuse of Process

The filing of the First Lawsuit was not an abuse of process, for two independent
reasons. First, the judicial proceedings privilege operates to bar claims for abuse of process
related to the filing of a lawsuit. Second, even if the judicial proceedings privilege for some
reason did not apply, the tort of abuse of process does not provide a remedy for grievances
related solely to the filing and maintenance of a lawsuit.
1.

The judicial proceedings privilege.

As noted above, the judicial proceedings privilege applies to immunize from tort
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liability (other than for the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings) all statements or actions
taken during or related to litigation. See, e.g., Beezley, 286 P.2d at 1058 (stating that the
privilege protects "all pleadings and affidavits necessary to set the judicial machinery in
motion"). Accordingly, the privilege also applies to bar abuse of process claims related to
the filing of a lawsuit. See, e.g., Drasin v. Jacoby & Myers, 150 Cal. App. 3d 481, 485
(1984) (stating that "the filing of a complaint" is "privileged" under the judicial proceedings
privilege for purposes of an abuse of process claim).
Although HCU is unaware of any Utah reported decision applying the judicial
proceedings privilege to abuse of process claims, HCU submits that the privilege should
apply to abuse of process claims just as squarely as it does to claims for defamation, tortious
interference, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. After all, as this Court stated in
Price v. Armour when extending the privilege to tortious interference claims:
The whole purpose of the judicial proceedings privilege is to ensure free and
open expression by all participants in judicial proceedings by alleviating any
and all fear that participation will subject them to the risk of subsequent legal
actions. There is no reason to distinguish statements that may defame a person
from statements that may interfere with that person's business relations. The
purpose of the judicial privilege remains the same. Holding that a defamatory
statement made during a judicial proceeding is absolutely privileged but then
holding that the privilege does not apply to the claim that the statement
interfered with a business relation would defeat the very purpose of the
privilege and would chill free and open expression in the judicial setting.
See Price, 949 P.2d at 1258. Following this reasoning, the United States District Court for
the District of Idaho, applying Utah law, held that the judicial proceedings privilege applies
to abuse of process claims. See Christonson v. U.S., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1195 (D. Idaho
2006). The United States District Court for the District of Utah apparently came to the same
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decision under Utah law, in an unpublished decision referenced in a Tenth Circuit decision.
See Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds v. Newpark Resources, Inc., 917 F.2d 1239,
1249 n.ll (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that the district court below "stated that the absolute
privilege for testimony given in a judicial proceeding barred the abuse of process claim" but
for procedural reasons not reaching the issue itself). Other states are in agreement.8
Accordingly, the judicial proceedings privilege, as a matter of law, bars any abuse of
process claim Mountainwest might make related to the filing of the First Lawsuit. The only
tort that is available to parties allegedly aggrieved by the filing of a lawsuit is wrongful use
of civil proceedings. Outside of that, the judicial proceedings privilege operates to bar all
other tort claims based on the filing of a lawsuit, including claims for abuse of process.

8

See, e ^ , Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Bear Stearns & Co., 791 P.2d 587, 594-95 (Cal. 1990)
(stating that "[t]he policy of encouraging free access to the courts is so important that the
litigation privilege extends beyond claims of defamation to claims of abuse of process" and
to "any action except one for malicious prosecution"); Florida Evergreen Foliage v. DuPont
336 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1269-70 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (holding that the privilege applied to an
abuse of process claim); Miller v. Reinert 839 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming
dismissal of abuse of process claim based on the privilege); Baglini v. Lauletta. 768 A.2d
825, 833-34 (N.J. Super. App. Div.) (holding that the privilege applies to abuse of process
claims, and stating that "the one tort excepted from the reach of the litigation privilege" is
wrongful use of civil proceedings), cert, denied, 782 A.2d 425 (N.J. 2001); Klapperv. Guria.
582 N.Y.S.2d 892, 896 (App. Div. 1992) (holding that the privilege applied to an abuse of
process claim); Barefield v. DPIC Companies. Inc., 600 S.E.2d 256, 560 (W.Va. 2004)
(stating that the privilege applied to an abuse of process claim); but see Havoco of America
v. Hollobow. 702 F.2d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying Illinois law and stating that "the
only cause of action recognized for the wrongful filing of a lawsuit is one for malicious
prosecution or abuse of process"); Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P.2d 143, 146 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that the privilege did not insulate attorneys from abuse of process
claims due in part to attorneys' high ethical responsibilities).
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2.

The tort of abuse of process does not provide a remedy for
grievances related to the filing of a lawsuit.

More substantively, and as the district court recognized, the tort of abuse of
process—as distinguished from the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings—is simply not
designed to address grievances arising out of the initiation of a lawsuit.9 Indeed, "an action
challenging the initiation of a lawsuit is an action for malicious prosecution or for wrongful
bringing of civil proceedings, and not for abuse of process," because the "gist of the tort" of
abuse of process "is not commencing an action or causing process to issue without
justification, but misusing, or misapplying, process justified in itself for an end other than
that which it was designed to accomplish." See Keller. 896 F. Supp. at 1570 (quoting
Prosser&Keeton on the Law of Torts); see also Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch. 953 P.2d357,
367 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Keller); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 682, cmt. a
(stating that "[t]he gravamen of the misconduct for which liability under [abuse of process]
is imposed is not the wrongful procurement of legal process or the wrongful initiation of
criminal or civil proceedings"). In fact, Utah's appellate courts have made clear that, for
purposes of an abuse of process claim, "it is immaterial whether [the] proceeding was
baseless or not," Hatch. 2004 UT App 378, f 33, 102 P.3d 774, and that "there is no abuse
of process when the action is filed to intimidate and embarrass the defendant knowing there
is no entitlement to recover the full amount of damages sought," id. at ^| 14 (quoting Lyons

9

It is also worth noting that this Court has previously stated its intention to construe all
of the "abusive litigation" torts narrowly, because "these torts have the potential to impose
an undue chilling effect on the ordinary citizen's willingness to bring a civil dispute to court
and, as a consequence, the torts have traditionally been regarded as disfavored causes of
action." Anderson Dev. Co.. 2005 UT 36, f59, 116 P.3d 323 (emphasis added).
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v. Midwest. 235 F. Supp. 2d 1030,1042 (N.D. Iowa 2002)). Even more recently, in Hatch.
this Court declared that an abuse of process claim will fail if "the acts alleged as the irregular
acts were no more than the filing of a 'groundless' lawsuit." See Hatch, 2006 UT 44, ^[39,
- P.3d —. This Court explained that the filing of an allegedly "groundless" lawsuit does not,
in and of itself, amount to an abuse of process, for the following reason:
The focus of the "essence" of abuse of process is on the tortfeasor's motive.
But motive is not enough. The tortfeasor must also have undertaken a "wilful
act." It is easy to slip into the conceptual trap of simply defining the "wilful
act" as the legal process that the tortfeasor pursues according to his ulterior
motive. Such a definition would, however, render the "wilful act" requirement
superfluous. Under it, a party would only be required to link a bad motive to
an event having the hallmarks of legal process to state a claim.
Id. at Tf37. This Court went on to state that, "[t]o satisfy the 'wilful act' requirement, a party
must point to conduct independent of legal process itself that corroborates the alleged
improper purpose." Id. at ^39 (emphasis added).
Mountainwest has fallen into the "conceptual trap" that this Court warned about.
Under Utah law, even if Mountainwest were to allege that HCU filed the First Lawsuit out
of spite, knowing that it had no entitlement to the damages sought, there would be no claim
for abuse of process as a matter of law related to the actual initiation of the suit.
Accordingly, Mountainwest simply cannot state a cause of action for abuse of process
stemming from the filing of the First Lawsuit.
B.

Mountainwest Has Provided No Evidence that the Filing of the Lis
Pendens Constituted an Abuse of Process

Similarly, Mountainwest cannot prove a cause of action for abuse of process related
to the filing of the Lis Pendens either. Mountainwest's claim for abuse of process related to
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the Lis Pendens suffers from both legal and factual infirmities.
1.

Legal infirmities: The judicial proceedings privilege

As noted above, the filing of a lis pendens—even an improperly filed one—is
protected from liability by the judicial proceedings privilege. See Hansen, 550 P.2d at 190;
Bower. 201 F. Supp. 2d at 1138-39. Although Utah's appellate courts have not had the
opportunity to consider this issue in the context of an abuse of process claim, the same result
should obtain. In Hansen, this Court held that a party allegedly aggrieved by the filing of a
lis pendens could not state a claim for slander of title resulting from that lis pendens. See
Hansen, 550 P.2d at 190. And in Bower, Utah's federal district court held that a party
allegedly aggrieved by the filing of a lis pendens—even assuming that the lis pendens was
improperly filed—could not state a claim for tortious interference. See Bower, 201 F. Supp.
2d at 1138-39. The same policies that counsel in favor of barring claims for slander of title
and tortious interference also counsel in favor of barring abuse of process
claims—participation injudicial proceedings will be no less inhibited by allowing abuse of
process claims based on the filing of a lis pendens than it will be by allowing tortious
interference or slander of title claims on the same basis. For these reasons, and for the
reasons stated above in part II.A.l, the judicial proceedings privilege applies to abuse of
process claims related to the filing of a lis pendens.
Mountainwest cites two cases from other jurisdictions, and argues that other states do
allow a lis pendens to form the basis for an abuse of process cause of action. See Aplt. Br.,
at 12 (citing Salstrom v. Starke, 670 P.2d 809 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), and Broadmoor Apts.
v. Horwitz, 413 S.E.2d 9 (S.C. 1992)). These cases are unhelpful, however, because they
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contain absolutely no discussion of the application of the judicial proceedings privilege, and
therefore do not even address the relevant question, which is whether the judicial proceedings
privilege immunizes the filing of a lis pendens from an abuse of process claim. Indeed, a
later-decided Colorado case highlights the unhelpfulness of the Salstrom case—in Westfield
Dev. Co. v. Rifle Investment Assocs., 786 P.2d 1112 (Colo. 1990), the Colorado Supreme
Court considered it an open question in Colorado "whether the filing of the notice of a lis
pendens may ever constitute abuse of process" in light of the privilege. Id. at 1116 n.2.
Other states, however, have reached the precise question at issue here, and have
determined that the filing of a lis pendens is immunized by the judicial proceedings privilege
from abuse of process claims. See, e.g.. City of Angoon v. Hodel, 836 F.2d 1245,1247 (9th
Cir. 1987) (applying Alaska law); Woodcourt II Ltd. v. McDonald Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d
245,249-51(1981) (applying California law): Kopp v. Franks, 792 S.W.2d 413,424-25 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1990) (applying Missouri law). In Hodel, the Ninth Circuit examined Alaska law,
and noted that the Alaska Supreme Court, in an earlier case, had already determined that
"notice of lis pendens does not give rise to a cause of action for slander or disparagement of
title" because of the judicial proceedings privilege. Hodel, 836 F.2d at 1247 (citing
Zamarello v. Yale, 514 P.2d 228,230 (Alaska 1973)). Based on this historical treatment of
the issue by the Alaska Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded as follows:
To grant notice of lis pendens a privileged status, which insulates it from
slander or disparagement of title actions, would serve no purpose if lis pendens
could be the basis for an abuse of process claim. Factual situations that would
support a cause of action for slander of title could also support a cause of
action for abuse of process. To prevent emasculation of the privilege, we
conclude that Alaska would extend the privilege to an abuse of process claim.
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Id.
This Court's historical treatment of the issue is substantively identical to the Alaska
Supreme Court's treatment of the issue prior to Hodel. This Court has stated, in Hansen, 550
P.2d at 190, that the filing of a lis pendens is protected from liability by the judicial
proceedings privilege. Indeed, in Hansen, this Court cited with approval to the Alaska
Supreme Court's treatment of the issue in Zamarello v. Yale. See Hansen, 550 P.2d at 190
n.7. Against this backdrop, the Hodel case is directly on point.
Accordingly, the judicial proceedings privilege operates to immunize the filing of a
lis pendens—even an unauthorized one—from liability for abuse of process.
2.

Factual infirmities*

Finally, even if Mountainwest could overcome the judicial proceedings privilege, it
has nevertheless failed to point to evidence sufficient to satisfy the elements of a claim for
abuse of process related to the filing of the Lis Pendens.
a.

HCU had no ulterior purpose in filing the Lis Pendens.

The first element of an abuse of process claim is demonstrating that the defendant had
an ulterior purpose. See Anderson Dev. Co., 2005 UT 36, ^[65.116 P.3d 323. Mountainwest
failed to produce any evidence that HCU had an ulterior purpose in filing the Lis Pendens.
HCU had but one purpose in filing the Lis Pendens: to give notice to prospective
purchasers of its pending lawsuit against SDCH. The lawsuit of which the Lis Pendens gave
notice was one that expressly sought an injunction preventing SDCH from using the property
for purposes not allowed by the agreements. See R. at 418-38. The express purpose of the
First Lawsuit was to restrict the use of the property to purposes permitted by the agreements;
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the express purpose of the Lis Pendens was to notify prospective purchasers that there was
a lawsuit pending in which HCU sought to restrict the use of the property in question to
purposes permitted by the agreements. This was the only purpose of the First Lawsuit and
the Lis Pendens, and Mountainwest does not even argue that there was any other purpose.
In many cases, including the ones cited by Mountainwest, the filers of a lis pendens
do have an ulterior purpose. In both cases cited by Mountainwest, the "ulterior" purpose of
the filing of the lis pendens was to extort or pressure the seller of a parcel of property to sell
the property to the filer at a reduced price. See Salstrom, 670 P.2d at 811 (stating that "the
jury could infer" that "the purpose to be served by filing [the lis pendens] was to prevent a
sale to any other party and to coerce [the seller] to consider Salstrom's previous offers" to
purchase the property); Broadmoor, 413 S.E.2d at 12 (stating that the filer had an "ulterior
purpose of preventing a sale to third parties in hopes of obtaining financial backing with
which to purchase the property at an advantageous price"). In this case, by contrast, HCU
had no such "ulterior" purpose in filing the Lis Pendens—HCU had no interest in purchasing
the property from SDCH at a lower price, and was not trying to use the Lis Pendens as
leverage to force such a sale. Rather, HCU was simply trying to stop SDCH from putting the
property to uses that HCU felt violated the 1989 conveyances. There was only one purpose;
there was no "ulterior" purpose.
Unable even to postulate about any ulterior purposes, Mountainwest argues that
HCU's primary purpose must have been "ulterior" because the Lis Pendens was
illegitimately filed. See Aplt. Br., at 11-12 (stating that "[i]f the only proper motive for
recording the Lis Pendens was not available to HCU, then its decision to record the Lis
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Pendens must have been born of an ulterior motive"). This semantic argument cannot
withstand scrutiny. The word "ulterior" means that which is "beyond what is manifest, seen,
or avowed" and is something "intentionally kept concealed." See Black's Law Dictionary,
6th ed., at 1522. HCU did not conceal its purpose; indeed, HCU's purpose was expressly
stated from the outset of the filing of the First Lawsuit, and also was expressly stated right
on the face of the Lis Pendens itself:
[HCU], the above-named plaintiff, has a pending Complaint against the abovenamed defendant [SDCH] in the above-entitled Court for injunctive relief
against [SDCH's] proposed use of certain real property owned by [SDCH].
See Lis Pendens (R. at 242).
In the end, HCU had only one purpose, and that purpose was expressly broadcast for
all to see in the bright light of day. HCU had no "ulterior" purpose in filing the Lis Pendens,
and for this reason Mountainwest's claim for abuse of process fails for lack of evidence.
b.

The filing of the Lis Pendens did not constitute a wilful act that
was not proper in the regular course of the proceedings.

The second element of an abuse of process claim is demonstrating that HCU
committed a wilful act in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution of the
proceedings. See Hatch, 2006 UT 44, ^[36, - P.3d —. Mountainwest has not produced any
evidence in support of this element either.
Mountainwest argues that the filing of the Lis Pendens was an act not proper in the
regular course of the proceedings for purposes of an abuse of process claim, because the Lis
Pendens did not implicate title, or right of possession of, the property in question. See Aplt.
Br., at 9-10. But Mountainwest overlooks the fact that "the filing of a notice of lis pendens
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does not constitute process for the purpose of an abuse of process claim." See Hodel, 836
F.2d at 1247 (citing Woodcourt IL 119 Cal. App. 3d at 249, 251). The California Court of
Appeal stated as follows in reaching its conclusion in Woodcourt II:
[Recording notice of pending action does not constitute process in the sense
that "abuse of process" is used. Process is a means whereby a court compels
a compliance with its demands. Thus, the essence of the tort "abuse of
process" lies in the misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the
name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of perpetrating an
injustice. Since defendant took no action pursuant to authority of court,
directly or by ancillary proceedings, no judicial process was abused.
See Woodcourt IL 119 Cal. App. 3d at 251-52. The filing of a lis pendens is not a summons
or a subpoena whereunder the filer/user is drawing on the processes of the court to compel
a third party to perform a certain action. The filing of a lis pendens is simply a notice that
restates the fact of the pending lawsuit, and is not "process." Several other states have
followed California's approach. See, e.g., Podolsky v. Alma Energy Corp., 143 F.3d 364,
372 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Illinois law, and stating that "the lis pendens filing in this case
did not involve the misuse of the process of the court," and affirming dismissal of an abuse
of process claim); HodeL 836 F.2d at 1247-48; Gray v. Kohlhase, 502 P.2d 169 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1972) (holding that the filing of a lis pendens does not constitute a "process" for the
purpose of an abuse of process claim); Bonnie Braes Farms, Inc. v. Robinson, 598 S.W.2d
765 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that "[t]he lis pendens is merely a notice required by statute
to protect the interests of any subsequent purchasers" and "[i]t is filed without intervention
of the judicial authority and brings neither the property nor any parties before the court," and
holding that "[sjince there is no process, there can be no abuse of process").
Even if HCU's Lis Pendens can be considered process, Mountainwest has still not
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shown that the Lis Pendens was a wilful act not proper in the proceedings. As this Court has
stated, in order to meet the "wilful act" requirement there must be something in Mountainwest's allegations "that distinguishes] [HCU's] conduct from process that is merely accompanied by spite, ill-will, or any of the other less agreeable human emotions that frequently
attach themselves to court papers." Hatch, 2006 UT 44, ^[38, - P.3d —. The filing of a lis
pendens, even if motivated by spite, is by itself not enough to amount to an abuse of process.
Moreover, the Lis Pendens was completely truthful and straightforward. As noted
above, the Lis Pendens, on its face, made no claim to title. All it said was that there was a
pending lawsuit "for injunctive relief against [SDCH' s] proposed use of certain real property
owned by [SDCH]." See R. at 242 (emphasis added). As such, the Lis Pendens was
completely truthful, and contained an entirely accurate description of the pending lawsuit.
Stated another way, the Lis Pendens did not even purport to affect title to the property in
question. A completely truthful and accurate document cannot by definition be improper.
Mountainwest claims, however, that this accurate Lis Pendens "effectively stopped
everything" and torpedoed the medical facility project. See Aplt. Br., at 8. But this
conclusion does not necessarily follow from the filing of the Lis Pendens. A lis pendens that
does not even purport to affect title should not affect title. A reasonable title company
reviewing HCU's Lis Pendens ought not be bothered by it, because it did not even purport
to affect title. Mountainwest bears the burden of actually proving its claim that the Lis
Pendens "effectively stopped everything," and it has not carried that burden. As noted above,
Mountainwest sat idle during the discovery period in this case, and as a result the only
evidence it can point to is the belated and untimely affidavit of Richard Vincent, which for
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several reasons is insufficient to allow Mountainwest to survive summary judgment.
As an initial matter, and as discussed below in Part III, the Vincent affidavit is
inadmissible, because it lacks foundation and because it was untimely submitted. For these
reasons alone, the Vincent affidavit should have been stricken, and cannot be used to support
Mountainwest's claims.
More specifically, however, Mr. Vincent has no foundation to make claims that "[t]he
notice of lis pendens effectively stopped the project." See R. at 409. Mountainwest needs
admissible testimony from someone at the lender or at the title company to prove this point.
Only those individuals can truly say why the medical facility was "effectively stopped."
Anything Mr. Vincent has to say on the issue is hearsay and/or without foundation. Were
there other reasons that the financing did not go through? Did a title company refuse to
insure title to the property based solely on the Lis Pendens, or was something else going on?
Because Mountainwest completely ignored this case during the discovery phase, these facts
were never elicited, and Mountainwest has no evidence from anyone competent to testify
thereto that the Lis Pendens had anything to do with stopping the project.
Moreover, the Lis Pendens was only robust for 3/4 months. It was filed in early
March 2000, and by the end of June 2000 SDCH had procured a ruling from Judge Allphin
that the Lis Pendens was a "wrongful lien." See R. at 401-03. Surely Mountainwest cannot
maintain that a lis pendens that has been adjudicated as a wrongful lien will prevent a title
company from insuring title. And Mr. Vincent's affidavit contains no testimony as to the
timing of any of this—he does not say whether the lender and title company allegedly made
their decision during this 3Vi-month window or during some other time. Mr. Vincent also
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does not even discuss the reasons why the project could not have been resuscitated after the
June 2000 ruling from Judge Allphin.10
All of this nicely points out one important fact that Mountainwest conveniently
overlooks: that there exist a myriad of remedies, apart from an abuse of process claim,
available to a party allegedly aggrieved by the filing of a lis pendens. First and foremost,
there is the remedy that SDCH used in the First Lawsuit—the remedies available under
Utah's wrongful lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(6). This statute provides an avenue
for parties allegedly harmed by a lis pendens or other lien to remove the lien and even
recover damages if appropriate. Id. SDCH used this statute to obtain a ruling from Judge
Allphin that the Lis Pendens was a wrongful lien.
Second, and relatedly, a party can simply file a motion seeking removal of the lien or
lis pendens. The litigants in the Bower case sought (and obtained) removal of the allegedly
offending lis pendens, see Bower v. Stein Eriksen Lodge Owners9 Ass'n. 16 Fed. Appx. 985
(10th Cir. 2001), and SDCH eventually filed a motion in the First Lawsuit, following Judge
Allphin's "wrongful lien" ruling, asking that the Lis Pendens be removed. This method is
simple and effective for getting rid of offending liens and lis pendens.
Alternatively, if the elements are met a party can file a claim for wrongful use of civil

Mountainwest also attached to its filings below an affidavit from SDCH's Gordon
Bennett that had been submitted in the First Lawsuit. In that affidavit, Mr. Bennett avers that
Mountainwest "had a commitment for financing which has been suspended by reason of the
filing of the Lis Pendens." See R. at 416. It should go without saying that this affidavit is
rank hearsay; Mr. Bennett was not affiliated with the lender or title company, and his
speculative musings on the issue of why the financing apparently fell through are
inadmissible, and the trial court recognized this. Id. at 530, p. 43-44.
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proceedings, in cases where the lis pendens gives notice of a "baseless" or "frivolous"
lawsuit. See Woodcourt IL 119 Cal. App. 3d at 251 (discussing remedies available to a party
who feels aggrieved by a lis pendens, and stating that "a lis pendens may be an element of
an action for malicious prosecution in a proper case").
Despite the availability of these other remedies, Mountainwest did not avail itself of
any of them. Rather, Mountainwest, several years later, filed this lawsuit alleging abuse of
process and tortious interference. The facts of this case simply do not fit these causes of
action, and in any event Mountainwest has done nothing to prove the causes of action. For
all of these reasons, the district court was correct to dismiss both of Mountainwest's causes
of action, and the district court's decision in this regard should be affirmed.
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO STRIKE THE
AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD VINCENT
With respect to its treatment of the affidavit of Richard Vincent, however, the district

court erred and its determination not to strike that affidavit should be reversed.11 The
affidavit is inadmissible for two independent reasons.
A,

The Affidavit Is Untimely in Light of Mountainwest's Utter Failure to
Respond to Discovery

As noted above, Mountainwest completely failed to provide HCU with initial
disclosures listing relevant witnesses, and completely failed to respond to written discovery
requests specifically asking for the identity of relevant witnesses. As a result, HCU had no
opportunity to depose any of Mountainwest's witnesses, including Richard Vincent. It was
11

The Court only need reach this issue if it determines that the Vincent affidavit raises
a genuine issue of material fact. Depending upon this Court's resolution of this and other
issues pending in this appeal, HCU's cross-appeal could be mooted.
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not until discovery had closed and a summary judgment motion was pending against it that
Mountainwest for the first time produced the affidavit of Mr. Vincent. Mountainwest's
failure to participate in discovery should bar it from presenting witnesses in this case.
Under such circumstances, the rules plainly contemplate that the noncompliant party
may be barred from presenting witnesses. Rule 37(d) states that where a party fails
to serve answers or obj ections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after
proper service of the interrogatories . . . the court in which the action is
pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just,
and among others it may take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B),
and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
Subdivision(b)(2) allows district courts to impose any of the sanctions on noncompliant
parties in the form of an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in
evidence. See Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) & (d). Applied to this case, it would not be "just"
to allow Mountainwest to put forth witnesses when it completely failed to respond to HCU's
discovery. On the contrary, the only just result is to strike the Affidavit of Richard Vincent.
Moreover, Rule 37(f) provides additional support. That paragraph provides that
where a party fails to disclose a witness, that party "shall not be allowed to use the witness
. . . unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to
disclose." See Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f). Here, there can be question that Mountainwest5s failure
to respond to HCU's discovery or to identify a single witness was not "harmless." It
deprived HCU of any meaningful opportunity to prepare its defense to Mountainwest's
allegations. Further, there was no good cause for Mountainwest's failure to respond to
discovery during the eight months when discovery was open and HCU's requests were
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pending, or for its complete failure to engage in the discovery process.
B.

The Affidavit Lacks Proper Foundation

An independent reason (aside from Mountainwest's failure to comply with its
discovery obligations) exists for striking the operative paragraphs of the Mr. Vincent's
affidavit. Though Mr. Vincent recites his position as Secretary/Treasurer of the Mountain
West Surgical Center LLC and Mountainwest Medical Properties, LLC, in paragraphs 12-19
he proceeds to testify about the actions and motivations of other entities. Accordingly, these
statements lack foundation. Utah appellate courts have made clear on several occasions that
affidavits submitted in connection with summary judgment motions must be based on the
affiant's personal knowledge, must have proper foundation, and cannot be conclusory. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (stating that affidavits submitted in connection with summaryjudgment
motions "shall be made on personal knowledge" and "shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein"); see also In re General Stream
Adjudication, 1999 UT 39,1ffl26-27, 982 P.2d 65 (affirming a ruling striking affidavits "not
based on personal knowledge, lack[ing] foundation, and containing] hearsay").12
Mr. Vincent is not qualified to testify about what Mountainwest's lender discovered
in paragraph 12. He is not the lender, nor does he explain how he has first-hand knowledge
of this. In paragraph 13, Mr. Vincent is not qualified to testify regarding the reasons for
SDCH's failing to deed the properties to his LLCs or why Mountainwest's lender withdrew
12

See also Treloggan v. Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) (holding that an
affidavit based on unsubstantiated belief is insufficient); Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857,
859 (Utah 1983) (holding that conclusory affidavits are invalid); GNS Partnership v. Fullmer,
873 P.2d 1157,1164-65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (holding that affidavits not based on personal
knowledge were properly stricken).
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its commitment for construction financing. He is not a representative of either SDCH's or
Mountainwesfs lender.
Similarly, Mr. Vincent is not qualified to discuss or characterize, in paragraphs 14 and
15, HCU's claims in a lawsuit to which his company was not a party. As a non-lawyer and
someone who has no interest in the properties in question, he is not qualified to testify
regarding "restrictive covenants" or opine as to what restrictions were intended to be placed
upon property neither he nor any company he worked with ever owned. The restrictive
covenant and agreements regarding the use of the property apply to properties owned by
SDCH, and not any entity represented by Mr. Vincent.
In paragraphs 17 and 18, Mr. Vincent, as "Secretary/Treasurer" of Mountainwest
Properties, characterizes what Mountain West Surgical intended to do and makes legal
conclusions regarding how those compare with an agreement to which he was not a party.
His interpretation of the agreements between SDCH and HCU is without foundation, either
as factual testimony or, more accurately, expert opinion disguised in affidavit form.
Finally, paragraph 19 is not only wholly irrelevant, but the conclusion that "it became
clear that HCU would continue its efforts to interfere with the construction of the medical
center," both assumes facts and is made without proper foundation.
Accordingly, though the entire Affidavit should be stricken for Plaintiffs' failure to
disclose Mr. Vincent as a witness or to produce any documents which might support the
statements in his Affidavit, the operative paragraphs (paragraphs 12-19) should be stricken
independently for lack of foundation.
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For these reasons, the district court erred by not striking the affidavit of Richard
Vincent, and the district court's decision in this regard should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's order dismissing both of
Mountainwest's claims should be affirmed, the district court's order refusing to strike the
affidavit of Richard Vincent should be reversed, and all of Mountainwest's claims against
HCU should be dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits.
DATED this 2 ^ day of August, 2006.
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

By: fCca A^yh^
Andre)vM. Stone
Marc^ Rejbhtenbach
Ryan mfHarris
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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